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INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans have a hard time understanding the history and na-
ture oftribal sovereignty. Many are surprised that it even exists. Those who 
learn about it often see it as anomalous and extraneous to the basic division 
of powers between the federal  government and the states. Their confusion 
about the origins and current legal status of Indian nations is further con-
founded  by reading news stories about actions of tribal  governments that 
non-Indians may perceive as incomprehensible or unfair. When a tribe ex-
pels members because they cannot prove a  sufficient blood connection to 
the tribe, many wonder how it is  possible for citizenship to  be defined by 
race in 2012. 
1 They may also wonder if an in-group is trying to  maximize 
returns from casino profits by excluding others from the pool of available 
recipients of  those funds. When a court grants custody of  a two-year-old girl 
to a tribal citizen, removing her from the only (non-Indian) parents she has 
ever known,  some may wonder if tribal sovereignty itself is  a  luxury we 
cannot  afford. 
2  And  when  a  tribe  expels  the  descendants  of its  former 
*  © 2013 Joseph William Singer. 
**  Bussey Professor of Law,  Harvard Law School.  Thanks and  affection  goes to 
Martha Minow and Mira Singer. This Article was presented at a symposium held at Michi-
gan  State  University  College  of Law  in  October 2012  to  honor  and  celebrate  Professor 
Wenona Singe)  and to  respond to  her article, Wenona T.  Singe), Indian  Tribes and Human 
Rights Accountability, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 567 (2012). 
I.  Pa/a Indian Tribe in San Diego County Expels /54 Members,  L.A. TIMES (Feb. 
2,  20 12),  http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/20 12/02/indian-tribe-in-northem-san-diego-
county-expels-154-members.html. 
2.  See Adoptive Couple v.  Baby Girl, 731  S.E.2d 550, 554, 567 (S.C. 20 12); Bio-
logical  Father Regains Custody of Two-Year-Old Cherokee  Daughter in  Adoption  Battle, 308  Michigan State Law Review  2013:307 
slaves, they  may wonder how  a sovereign can enslave people because of 
their race and then deny them citizenship for the same reason. 
3 
All these cases are in fact far more complicated than they first appear. 
After all, if a tribe let anyone become a citizen who wished to join the tribe, 
tribal powers would grow relative to those of state governments and many 
non-Indians would react negatively to this-perhaps seeking federal laws to 
limit tribal citizenship to those who can show a sufficient historical connec-
tion to the tribe. Nor is it unusual for there to be painful custody battles over 
children when biological parents change their minds about adoption and the 
courts  take  far  too  long to  resolve  the  matter,  as  has  happened time and 
again with non-Indian children. Even the  freed slave problem has its com-
plications. After all, when African American slaves were emancipated, they 
were not adopted by their former  slave owners--even when those owners 
were their biological fathers. If tribes are nations in the strong sense-with 
shared culture, religious  life,  and political and familial  organization-it is 
understandable why tribes limit membership through norms chosen by the 
majority. 
While each of  these cases is complicated, each also highlights the per-
ennial danger that hard-to-accept tribal governmental decisions may result 
in calls for federal legislation to diminish or even abolish tribal sovereignty 
completely. Nor is this an unfounded worry; in the past, the United States 
has,  from  time  to  time,  disestablished tribal  governments  or actively  re-
duced or eliminated some of their powers.
4  The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly affirmed the power of the United States to do this unilaterally without 
the consent of the tribes.5 Nor is  it uncommon today for groups of citizens 
to lobby for policies that would deny or limit tribal sovereignty. 
6 
The  legal and political contours of tribal sovereignty are not easy to 
compass. Federal law regulates both the federal-tribal relationship and the 
state-tribal relationship in notoriously complicated ways.  More fundamen-
INDIAN  COUNTRY  TODAY  (Jan.  9,  2012), 
http:/  /indiancountrytodayrnedianetwork.com/20 12/0 I /09/biological-father-regains-custody-
of-two-year-old-cherokee-daughter-in-adoption-battle-71309. 
3.  Steve  Olafson,  Second-Largest  U.S.  Indian  Tribe  Expels  Slave Descendants, 
REUTERS  (Aug.  23,  2011,  9:16  PM),  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/us-
oklahoma-cherokee-idUSTRE77N08F20 II  0824. For an excellent analysis of the issues, see 
S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of  Freedmen's 
Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387 (2007). 
4.  COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN  LAW§ 1.06, at 85-86 (Nell Jessup New-
ton et al. eds., 2012) (describing the Termination Era). 
5.  See,  e.g.,  Lone Wolf v.  Hitchcock,  187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that the 
United States  has  plenary power over Indian  nations);  COHEN'S  HANDBOOK  OF  FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, §5.02, at 391. 
6.  Anti-Indian Sovereignty Movement and Its Politicians, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, 
(Feb.  22,  2002),  http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2002/02/22/anti-
indian-sovereignty-movernent-and-its-politicians-87520. Tribal Sovereignty and Human Rights  309 
tally,  Indian nations themselves have multiple and conflicting conceptions 
of what tribal sovereignty entails. 
7 Should Indian nations be treated as full-
fledged states under international law, as co-equal sovereigns with the Unit-
ed States yet somehow part of the  federal  system,  or as  recognized inde-
pendent sovereigns  subject to  some,  but not  all,  federal  powers?  Nor do 
Indian nations all  practice sovereignty in  the same manner.  Indeed, one of 
the most salient features of  tribal sovereignty is the diversity of structures of 
government that Indian nations have adopted. Within this diversity we can 
observe a variety of approaches to  the relationship between governmental 
powers and individual rights.  As is the case with all  sovereigns, Indian na-
tions have adopted different constitutional frameworks,  governmental sys-
tems,  legal  systems, and normative paradigms. Each has adopted a some-
what different set of  institutions and laws to ensure fair treatment of  citizens 
and non-citizens alike. Each grapples with one of the hardest questions any 
sovereign faces:  how can governmental powers be exercised in  a manner 
consistent with just and fair treatment for all persons? 
In her recent article, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 
8 
Professor Wenona Singel enters this contested terrain with resolve and clari-
ty of vision. She neither tries to marginalize the issue of  human rights nor to 
exaggerate the extent to which it challenges the very notion of tribal sover-
eignty.  Instead,  she  takes  seriously  the  concern  that  governments-
including tribal governments-may exercise power in unjust ways and that 
there needs to be institutional mechanisms in place to lower the possibility 
of that happening and to provide remedies when it does happen. Professor 
Singel  seeks  to  harmonize  and  integrate  tribal  sovereignty  with  human 
rights protection. She acknowledges tensions between sovereignty and hu-
man rights, but she also helpfully clarifies the nature of tribal sovereignty 
and its role in recognizing and respecting the humanity and dignity of each 
person. In so doing, she explains, not how sovereign powers are limited by 
human rights, but how the appropriate exercise of sovereignty requires pro-
tection of human rights.  That insight led her to  consider what institutional 
structures might be appropriate to recognize and enforce human rights. 
In  this  brief Comment,  I explore the  ways  Professor Singel  has  re-
shaped our understanding of both tribal sovereignty and human rights.  She 
suggests a new way to frame the relation between power and justice and, in 
7.  Rebecca Tsosie,  Separate Sovereigns,  Civil Rights,  and the  Sacred Text:  The 
Legacy of  Justice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 526 
(1994)  (quoting  DUANE  CHAMPAGNE,  AMERICAN  INDIAN  SOCIETIES:  STRATEGIES  AND 
CONDITIONS  OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL  12 (1989)) ("There is  no single Native 
American  culture  or normative  order;  native  North  America  is  composed of hundreds of 
different societies with numerous languages, religious orientations, and world views."). 
8.  Wenona T.  Singe!,  Indian  Tribes  and Human  Rights Accountability,  49  SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 567 (2012). 310  Michigan State Law Review  2013:307 
so doing, gives us  new institutional mechanisms that might better embody 
the twin values of self-government and human dignity.  I begin in Part I by 
commenting on the nature of sovereignty.  I focus  on the expulsion of the 
Cherokee Freedmen from the Cherokee Nation as a test case. In particular, I 
argue  that  legitimate  sovereignty  is not  absolute.  The  proper relationship 
between sovereignty and humanity  is  one  of mutual  reinforcement rather 
than tension.  The  natural  rights  tradition  teaches  us  that sovereigns  only 
have legitimate powers to act in a manner that recognizes the humanity and 
dignity of those they regulate.
9  One need not accept the  epistemology of 
natural rights to benefit from its core insight: just as liberty does not mean 
license, sovereignty does not mean tyranny. Our freedom to act is limited by 
the legitimate rights of  others, and the legitimate powers of  governments are 
similarly limited by the rights of human beings. This means that limits on 
sovereignty designed to protect human rights may be better conceptualized 
as elaboration ofthe legal framework oflegitimate sovereignty. 
In Part II,  I explain that a core insight of moral, political, and legal 
theory teaches that we  have  an obligation to justify our actions to  others 
when our actions affect them. Reason-giving is a core component of practi-
cal reason, as well as of  normative argument and the rule oflaw. An act can 
be deemed moral only if  one can give reasons others could or should accept 
for the ways one's conduct affects them. What is true of  morality is also true 
of politics  and  law;  the  practice  of reason-giving  helps  curtail  arbitrary 
power and thus can help render sovereignty compatible with humanity. Pro-
fessor Singel not only champions this core principle but develops an innova-
tive  institutional  setting  where  such reason-giving  can occur.  To  explain 
what is innovative about her proposal, I present a typology of forms of hu-
man  rights  accountability.  In particular,  I  argue  that  institutional  mecha-
nisms  for  protecting human rights may  adopt forms  of accountability that 
are (1) internal or external; (2) judicial or political; and (3) bilateral or mul-
tilateral. I also suggest the typical virtues and vices of  each of  these forms of 
accountability. 
Finally,  I conclude in Part III by showing how an  intertribal human 
rights  tribunal,  as  proposed by  Professor Singel,  combines  these  various 
forms of accountability or reason-giving in a manner that has the potential 
to maximize their virtues while minimizing their vices.  Since such a court 
would co-exist with other institutional accountability mechanisms, it might 
both usefully supplement those forms while limiting intrusion on tribal sov-
ereignty. While no institutional mechanism for reconciling power and jus-
tice  can ever be  perfect,  Professor Singel's nuanced law reform proposal 
merits consideration. 
9.  See generally JOHN LOCKE,  Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that natural rights limit the legitimate powers 
of  government). Tribal Sovereignty and Human Rights  311 
The creation of an intertribal human rights tribunal would be an exer-
cise  of tribal  sovereignty  rather than  a deprivation of it,  both  because  it 
would be negotiated and managed by the  tribes themselves and because it 
would establish the legitimate contours of their sovereignty. Such a tribunal 
may benefit tribes  by  giving them a  legitimate forum  where they can ac-
count for themselves by giving acceptable reasons for  their actions. While 
all tribes have  legal and constitutional practices that require reason-giving 
internally, an  intertribal  human rights tribunal  would add the benefits that 
come from giving reasons to outsiders. Because there are costs, as well as 
benefits, to giving up power to strangers, a negotiated tribal treaty establish-
ing  an  intertribal human  rights  tribunal  has  the  potential  to  protect tribes 
from  unwarranted  interference  by  outsiders  while  generating the  benefits 
that flow from the practice of explaining oneself to others who are capable 
of understanding one's perspective and who  are similarly sensitive to  the 
dangers of imperialism.  If this is  all true,  then an  intertribal human rights 
tribunal would promote both sovereignty and humanity. 
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMANITY 
For a  long  time,  the  Cherokee  Nation  of Oklahoma  has  been  em-
broiled in a persistent, painful controversy over whether the descendants of 
its former slaves should be counted as citizens of  the nation. This controver-
sy has  flared  up  recently  and  resulted in  both political  maneuvering  and 
legal action. 
10  Those who have  sought to  exclude the  Cherokee Freedmen 
from the tribe claim that they are not Cherokee, cannot prove they are de-
scended from tribal members, were never really treated as tribal citizens nor 
acted as such, and that the tribe was forced to include them formally as citi-
zens by a foreign sovereign-namely, the United States-that imposed the 
terms of a treaty on a less powerful nation.
11  Other Indian nations are not 
required to accept outsiders as citizens, and the Cherokee Nation should be 
I 0.  Litigation  still  proceeds  on  this  question.  See  generally  Cherokee  Nation  v. 
Nash, No.  11-CV-648-TCK-TLW, 2012 WL 314295 (N.D. Okla.  Feb.  I,  2012); Cherokee 
Nation v.  Nash, 724 F.  Supp. 2d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2010). See Jarrel Wade, Department of 
Interior  Makes  Counterclaim  in  Lawsuit  over  Cherokee  Nation  Freedmen  Descendants, 
TULSA  WORLD  (July  3,  2012,  2:27  AM), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid= II &articleid=20 120703 _II_  A9 _ U 
LNSbr851617; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Update in Cherokee Nation v.  Nash (Chero-
kee  Freedmen  Case),  TURTLE  TALK  (July  3,  2012,  10:06  AM), 
http:/  /turtletal  k. wordpress.com/20 12/07  /03/update-in-cherokee-nation-v-nash-cherokee-
freedmen-case/. For a history of  the origins of  the relations between the Cherokee Nation and 
the Freedpeople, see CELIA  E.  NAYLOR,  AFRICAN  CHEROKEES  IN  INDIAN  TERRITORY:  FROM 
CHATTEL TO CITIZENS (2008). 
II.  Alex  Kellogg,  Cherokee  Nation  Faces  Scrutiny for  Expelling  Blacks,  NAT'L 
PUB.  RADIO  (Sept.  29,  2011,  3:17  PM),  http://www.npr.org/2011/09/19/140594124/u-s-
govemment-opposes-cherokee-nations-decision. 312  Michigan State Law Review  2013:307 
treated no  differently. Nothing less than respect for tribal sovereignty is  at 
stake here. The tribe has voted to adopt a constitution that defines its mem-
bership to  exclude the Freedmen who cannot prove  descent from  a tribal 
member in a manner acceptable to the tribe.
12  If one believes in democracy, 
cultural pluralism, and the protection of internal affairs of sovereigns, then 
the  Cherokee Nation has  the  right to  control  its  criteria  for  citizenship.
13 
Every sovereign controls its immigration policy and its citizenship criteria, 
and Indian nations should be no different. In this view, requiring the Chero-
kee  Nation  to  accept  the  Freedmen as  members  is  unwarranted;  for  the 
United States to attempt to impose this on the tribe by withholding federal 
funds owed to the tribe is nothing more than a vestige of  colonialism. 
The Cherokee Freedmen and their  supporters argue, in  contrast, that 
the  criteria used by the Cherokee Nation to determine descent are flawed. 
Many  Freedmen  actually  do  have  Cherokee  blood  but  cannot  prove  it 
through the defective criteria used by the tribe.
14 Or they criticize the provi-
sion in the Treaty of 1866 between the tribe and the United States that rec-
ognized Freedmen as citizens of the Cherokee Nation only if they returned 
within six  months of the treaty signing-a time limit that excluded many 
people who  had been relocated  during the  Civil War and who  could not 
return within that time period because of lack of funds or ill health. 
15  Sup-
porters of the Freedmen also argue that they are tribal citizens, whether or 
not descended from the original Cherokees, because they were brought into 
the tribe when it enslaved them and thereby made them its own, not because 
the United States forced the tribe to accept them. A people cannot enslave 
another and then wash its hands of responsibility for its former slaves. If it 
is legitimate for the Cherokee Nation to expel the Freedmen from the tribe, 
then it would have been legitimate after the Civil War for the United States 
to ship all the freed slaves back to Africa even if they wanted to stay. If the 
one is unthinkable then so is the other. 
If the Freedmen have a plausible legal and moral claim to be counted 
as tribal citizens, then we have what may appear to be a clash between tribal 
sovereignty and human rights. It is important to notice that this involves two 
questions  rather than just one.  One question  is  whether expulsion of the 
Freedmen violates their human rights, and a second, different question, is 
who should decide this question? Should it be the Cherokee Nation through 
12.  See id. 
13.  Tsosie, supra note 7,  at 519 ("[T]ribal autonomy over membership decisions is 
an essential part of self-government."); see also id.  at 520 (stating that tribes should have the 
power to determine which traditional values will promote cultural survival). 
14.  Kellogg, supra note II. 
15.  Ray, supra note 3, at 405  ("The confluence of the Treaty's and  Constitution's 
six-month deadline for establishing residency, the dispersion of former slaves throughout the 
region due to war, and limited means of communicating vital  information meant that many 
former slaves did not return in time to receive tribal citizenship ....  "). Tribal Sovereignty and Human Rights  313 
its own political and legal procedures that decides this question, or should 
outsiders, including other sovereigns like the United States, have a say? 
If  the tribe is the decision making entity, then the conflict is an internal 
one involving only Cherokee political and legal institutions. Various Chero-
kee  governmental  institutions  have  addressed this  question,  including  the 
Supreme Court, the Principal Chief, the Tribal Council, and the voters.  As 
of  July 2012, the tribal institutions had concluded that the tribe's actions in 
expelling the Freedmen did not violate anyone's rights; either the Freedmen 
never were  legitimately Gitizens  of the tribe or the  citizens amended their 
Constitution to  make  this  so.
16  If the  tribe's sovereign institutions are  the 
relevant decision makers, then this exercise of sovereignty to define citizen-
ship is fully compatible with human rights protection. At the same time, as 
with any sovereign, its citizens may dispute whether the tribe interpreted its 
own Constitution and treaty obligations to the United States correctly. 
On the other hand, if  outsiders like the United States government have 
a right to criticize the tribe's decisions, and if they come to the conclusion 
that the human rights of the Freedmen have been violated, then we are con-
fronted  with  a  clash  between  respect  for  tribal  sovereignty  and  human 
rights.  As  it happens,  outsiders,  including  officials  of the  United  States, 
have opined that the decision of the Cherokee Nation violates not only the 
human rights ofthe Freedmen but also the terms of  the 1866 Treaty with the 
United States. 
17  For that reason, both members of Congress and the Depart-
ment of the Interior have reacted to the tribal decision to  expel the Freed-
men by withholding, or threatening to withhold, federal funds. IR 
The first thing to grapple with is the question of whether, in  fact, this 
case represents a clash of sovereignty and human rights. Assuming for the 
moment that it is a contested question whether the Freedmen's human rights 
have been violated, does an effort by the United States to induce the Chero-
kee Nation to recognize those rights constitute an attack on its sovereignty? 
To answer this  question, consider the  reverse case.  Suppose, for  example, 
that the United States has engaged in actions that deprive Cherokees of  their 
human rights. Would it be a violation of  the sovereignty of  the United States 
16.  Wade, supra note  I  0 (federal litigation is proceeding to challenge the Cherokee 
Nation's exclusion of  the Freedmen from citizenship). 
17.  Cherokee  Freedmen  Dispute  Threatens  HAHASDA,  INDIANZ.COM  (Apr.  24, 
2008), http://64.38.12.138/News/2008/008375.asp. 
18.  At one point, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
suspended more than $37 million in  payments to the Cherokee Nation because of the Freed-
men controversy. Kellogg, supra note  II. In  addition, members of Congress, especially the 
Black  Congressional Caucus,  sought  to  halt all  federal  payments to  the  Cherokee  Nation 
unless the Freedmen were reinstated. NAHASDA Clears Congress with Freedmen Provision, 
INDIANZ.COM  (Sept.  26,  2008),  http://www.indianz.com/News/2008/011070.asp;  Cherokee 
Freedmen Dispute Threatens HAHASDA, supra note 17. 314  Michigan State Law Review  2013:307 
for the Cherokee Nation to  demand that the United States desist? The an-
swer, I think, is no. Why not? 
Even  theorists  of absolute  sovereignty,  such  as  Thomas  Hobbes, 
acknowledge limitations on sovereignty necessary to protect human rights. 
Although Hobbes believed the sovereign has full authority to decide what is 
just and unjust as a matter of civil law, private citizens (like Hobbes) have 
the right to say what they think the law  of nature commands; and if such 
conclusions conflict with the law of  the land, this does not, by itself, consti-
tute rebellion or impinge on the sovereignty of the  Crown. 
19  Even though 
Hobbes does not recognize any civil or legal limitations on sovereignty, he 
does  identify human rights that the sovereign should respect. 
20  Moreover, 
Hobbes's firm belief in God and the reality of  punishment in the aftedife for 
sinners suggested that there were powerful reasons for the Crown to eschew 
tyranny and embrace good govemment.
21  Nor is Hobbes alone. Even Nicco-
lo  Machiavelli  argued that a prince who  wants to  retain power must not 
abuse his authority if  he wants to remain secure from rebellion or disorder.
22 
Most  political  and  legal  theorists go further.  Such thinkers  as  John 
Locke, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Jeremy Waldron argue that sov-
ereigns only have legitimate power to enforce laws that are consistent with 
the basic injunction to  treat each person with equal concern and respectY 
Sovereignty, in other words, is not absolute. Both the United States Consti-
tution  and  the  state  constitutions  and  all  modern  constitutions  adopted 
around the  world limit state power in order to protect human rights.  The 
international consensus of states seems to be that sovereignty is illegitimate 
when it is used in oppressive ways, and most philosophers agree. It is simp-
ly no answer to a human rights claim to argue that it is wrong to attempt to 
limit the power of a sovereign nation. To respond to a human rights com-
plaint by a foreign state or a noncitizen by arguing that it is  an attack on 
one's sovereignty  is  nonresponsive and  irrelevant.  If sovereign power is 
used in oppressive ways, then the invocation of sovereignty is no  defense 
whether the  complaint  comes  from inside  the  state  or  outside.  In other 
words, it is neither illegitimate, nor an affront to sovereignty, to demand that 
a sovereign justify its  treatment of its  people when that treatment is  per-
ceived to be unjust. 
19.  For Hobbes's theory of absolute sovereignty, see  generally,  THOMAS  HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN (Richard Tucked., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996) (1651). 
20.  /d.  at 93. 
21.  /d.  at 306-20,402-15. 
22.  NICCOLO  MACHIAVELLI,  THE  PRINCE  95-104 (New  Am.  Library  1952) (1532) 
(noting that the prince "must avoid being despised and hated"). 
23.  See,  e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 1-3 (2000). See generally LOCKE, supra note 9; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: 
A  RESTATEMENT  (Erin  Kelly  ed.,  2001);  RONALD  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY 
( 1977); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY ( 1988). Tribal Sovereignty and Human Rights  315 
Nor is  there  anything  amiss  about  one  nation  criticizing another or 
making such a demand for justificatory reasons for what appears to be un-
fair conduct by a sovereign. It is perfectly appropriate for the Cherokee Na-
tion to complain about unfair treatment by the United States and to demand 
that such behavior cease.  If this is so, then it is  equally appropriate for  the 
United States to do the same when it perceives a violation of human rights 
by the Cherokee Nation. When the Cherokee Nation asks, "How dare others 
tell  us  what to  do," one wants to  say,  "Be careful what you wish for."  If 
others cannot criticize you, then you cannot criticize them, even when their 
actions affect you.  It is not an  affront to  sovereignty to demand that other 
nations comply with minimum standards of civilized treatment of their peo-
ple.  People do  not lose  their right to  be  treated with dignity just because 
they are citizens of  another state. No nation is immune from criticism of its 
treatment of its own people.  When one witnesses what one perceives to  be 
oppression, it is not wrong to speak up; indeed, one may have an obligation 
to do  so to speak on behalf of those who are vulnerable and oppressed.  In 
some cases, outsiders have greater power to speak because they are not sub-
ject to punishment or control by an  oppressive sovereign that may use  its 
monopoly of  force to control its own people and stop them from speaking. 
A completely different-and more difficult--question is  whether an-
other sovereign like the United States has the right, not only to  express its 
opinion about what it considers to be human rights violations by the Chero-
kee Nation, but to  go further and attempt to  force  its will on the Cherokee 
Nation.  After all,  in  international  affairs,  force  is  generally  eschewed  in 
favor of dialogue unless a nation is acting in  self-defense. Yet it is routine 
for nations to make demands of  each other and to back up those demands by 
political and economic sanctions designed to induce compliance. Nations do 
this far short of going to  war by withdrawing or limiting trade or foreign 
aid,  limiting travel of one  nation's citizens to  the  other, withholding eco-
nomic  advantages of one  kind or another,  and even attempting to  isolate 
rogue nations who persist in violating human rights. Of course, it is the une-
qual  power of the  Cherokee  Nation  and  the  United  States  that  gives  us 
pause. It is more likely for the United States to impose its will on the Cher-
okee  Nation  than  the  reverse.  This  inequality  of power makes  us  worry 
about colonialism and imperialism.  In addition, it brings forth the  substan-
tial  worry  that  United  States  officials  may  be  ethnocentric  and  narrow-
minded and unable to understand the values, norms, and traditions of a dif-
ferent  people. After all,  we have experienced this before when the United 
States attempted to disrupt and abolish tribal sovereignty, to force Indians to 
become farmers and to adopt the institution of private property, and to give 
up tribal religious practices, languages, and customs. How do we know that 
this is not happening again? 
The answer is that we cannot know this for certain and that it remains 
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States has a monopoly on the content of  constitutional rights. The U.S. Con-
stitution is  a notoriously old-fashioned eighteenth century constitution be-
reft of  any protection for economic and social rights that exist in almost all 
twentieth  century  constitutions.  And  the  assertion  of sovereign  United 
States power over Indian nations remains at odds with its own core demo-
cratic, anti-imperialist values. 
All this is true, but it does not mean that a demand for human rights 
accountability is, by itself, an attack on a nation's sovereignty. Nor does it 
mean that it is categorically inappropriate for one nation to withhold bene-
fits  from another when it perceives the  other has engaged in oppression of 
its own people. Sovereignty is not absolute, and a demand that a sovereign 
comport itself in  a manner that is  consistent with  modern conceptions of 
fairness  and justice is  not an  inappropriate demand.  Actions have  conse-
quences, and just as it is problematic for the United States to impose its will 
on the  Cherokee Nation,  so  is  it  problematic  for  the  Cherokee Nation to 
demand that the United States defer to  its decisions about how to treat its 
own  people,  no  matter what,  especially when  Cherokee  citizens  are  also 
American citizens. 
24  This means that the mere fact that Professor Sin  gel has 
entertained the idea of an external forum designed to criticize, and perhaps 
enforce, limits on sovereign actions to protect human rights, does not mean 
that she has, in any way, attacked tribal sovereignty. 
At the same time, it behooves both sovereigns and the peoples of  each 
sovereign to try to understand the perspective of the other. What seems to 
some to be an unjust action may be justified within an alternative, legitimate 
moral and political framework that can be articulated and defended. Profes-
sor Singel is right then to argue that sovereign nations have an obligation to 
be held accountable for their practices that impinge on their citizens' human 
rights.  This brings us  to  the  question of defining the practical institutional 
frameworks that can best achieve this goal. 
II. REASON-GIVING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Theorists of morality, politics, and law all agree on the importance of 
reason-giving. Moral theorists teach that an action is moral if we  can give 
reasons that could or should be accepted (or at least cannot be reasonably 
rejected) by those our actions affect. 
25  Political theorists teach that an action 
24.  See  Tsosie, supra note 7,  at 509 (noting that the exercise of tribal  sovereign 
powers over persons who are "also protected by the laws and Constitution of  another sover-
eign" results in challenges to tribal sovereignty when it is exercised in ways that impinge on 
other sovereigns that have interests in protecting their own citizens). 
25.  Christine Korsgaard and T. M. Scanlon have both argued that morality requires 
that we justify our actions by reasons others can accept or cannot reasonably reject. RAINER 
FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF JUSTICE 66 
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is just if it could or should be accepted by all reasonable persons in a suita-
ble  decision-making setting where they are prompted to treat each person 
with equal concern and respect, understanding that we live in  a world with 
plural  values  and many competing comprehensive moral  doctrines. 
26  And 
both legal theorists and our legal institutions are premised on the importance 
of giving reasons why a rule of law should be acceptable to all affected by it 
and compatible with our deepest shared values. 
27 
The question then is what institutional form this accountability should 
take.  If we analyze Professor Singel's contribution, we learn that there are 
three basic choices we need to make in  shaping an accountability system. 
Accountability can be (1) internal or external; (2) judicial or political;  (3) 
bilateral  or multilateral.  It will  be  useful  to  describe  the  nature  of these 
choices and the advantages and disadvantages of  each form. 
A. Internal Versus External Accountability 
When one thinks about accountability, one generally imagines having 
to answer to others. If one never had to think about the effects of his or her 
actions on others or never had to give reasons for why others should not 
object to one's treatment of them, then one might imagine one would face 
no accountability at all.  The paradigm case of accountability is the obliga-
tion to explain to others affected by one's actions why those actions were 
legitimate. But a moment's notice will remind us that we are also accounta-
ble to  ourselves. Unless we are psychopaths or otherwise intellectually or 
morally deficient, we live in a moral universe. None of us feel  empowered 
to act without regard to the morality of our actions.  We have to  live with 
ourselves and that means we have to explain to ourselves why what we did 
was moral. That may require introspection or reflection, and in hard cases, it 
entails the attempt to reconcile conflicting norms and values, as well as rel-
evant examples. We try to develop consistent treatment of like cases, and 
this requires a combination of critical thought and intuitive reaction to par-
ticular cases. 
28 
So too do nations adopt both internal and external forms of accounta-
bility.  The human rights paradigm discussed by Professor Singel rests on 
in  THE  SOURCES  OF  NORMATIVITY  90-91,  113-15  (Onora O'Neill ed.,  1996);  MICHAEL  P. 
LYNCH,  IN  PRAISE  OF REASON  3 (2012);  T.M. SCANLON,  WHAT WE OWE To EACH  OTHER 4 
(1998). 
26.  See  generally  RAWLS,  supra  note  23;  JOHN  RAWLS,  POLITICAL  LIBERALISM 
(1996). 
27.  See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
899, 914-15 (2009). 
28.  See,  e.g.,  Richmond  Campbell  &  Victor  Kumar,  Moral  Reasoning  on  the 
Ground,  122  ETHICS 273, 286-87, 296 (2012) (explaining this conception of moral reason-
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the idea that nations are accountable to  other nations and the international 
community to comply with norms developed externally and sometimes co-
operatively  through  international  legal  norms,  practices,  and  institutions. 
But of  course each nation is also accountable to itself and to its own people. 
Just as individuals must explain themselves to themselves and learn to live 
with their actions, nations must defend themselves to their own people and 
defend their actions as in accord with their own values, practices, traditions, 
and aspirations. 
Internal accountability has the advantage of leaving one free to devel-
op one's own conscience, traditions, and sense of right and wrong. It is  a 
fundamental fact of human development that we must grapple with the mo-
rality of our actions.  We care about right and wrong, not only because we 
care about what other people think of us or how they will treat us,  but be-
cause we care about the kinds of beings we are. Internal accountability pro-
tects the freedom of the individual or the nation to chart one's own path and 
to develop and enact one's own values. It allows the community to develop 
its way of life, develop and articulate its values, tell its stories, ask its ques-
tions, search for meaning, and shape its social, economic, and legal relation-
ships. 
But internal accountability has costs as well. Without the need to look 
outside, one may  not learn what is lacking in  one's own worldview.  It is 
hard to see how the world could be different if one is imprisoned in one's 
own perspective. A medieval lord may have no conception of how society 
could be  organized if one abolished classes and  statuses and treated each 
person simply as a human being rather than as a lord or peasant, a priest or 
congregant,  a man  or woman,  or a king or subject. Being forced to  look 
outside and to answer to outsiders can open one's mind to the fact that ac-
tions one thought were normal might be considered by others to be oppres-
sive. Sometimes those outsiders are right. Each of  us has something to learn 
from comparing our institutions and norms to those of  others. 
One might even think of  external accountability as the sine qua non of 
moral  reasoning.  The base notion moral  theorists teach us  is  that we  are 
obligated to justify our actions to  others affected by them through offering 
reasons that they should accept or that they cannot reasonably reject.
29  Any 
sovereign (or individual) who  eschews external accountability deprives it-
self of one of  the most important ways that we discover whether our actions 
are  justified.  External  accountability  is  a  powerful  engine  of the  self-
awareness  and self-criticism that  are the  prerequisites for  moral  develop-
29.  See  FORST,  supra  note  25,  at  21;  CHRISTINE  M.  KORSGAARD,  Reflective  En-
dorsement, in THE SOURCES OFNORMATIVITY, supra note 25, at 49, 89; SCANLON, supra note 
25, at 154. For an elaboration of  the impact ofthis central truth on legal reasoning, see Sing-
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ment and learning. It forces one to articulate what may have been inchoate 
and to anticipate and answer objections others may pose to one's conduct. 
Conversely, although external accountability has the benefit of  forcing 
us to justify ourselves to others, it poses the danger that others may impose 
their values on us--or we on  them.  It is  not the  case, after all,  that others 
necessarily have a greater purchase on  right and wrong than we do.  They 
may not see the world the way we do; they may not share our values. There 
is  no guarantee that they have a better answer to the question of right and 
wrong than we do.  Our perspectives may even be so different that we can-
not  easily  communicate  our  moral  frameworks  and  assumptions  to  each 
other. 
One might hope that we could reconcile these forms of accountability, 
gaining the benefits of attempting to understand the views of others and to 
explain  our own views  to  them  while avoiding the  costs of having them 
wrongfully  and  unjustly  impose  their  views  on  us  (or our imposing  our 
views on them). We do, in fact, gain a great deal by engaging in moral con-
versation with those who view the world differently than we do;  we have 
much to  learn from  such dialogues.  At the  same  time, if others are  given 
power over us, the result may not be mutual learning and development, but 
rather the  kind of oppression associated with imperialism, colonialism, or 
forced conversion or assimilation. This is a tension we need to live with and 
manage. 
B. Judicial Versus Political Accountability 
There is  a tendency to assume that accountability is absent if there is 
no  legal (meaning judicial) mechanism for enforcing it. But of course, this 
is  not  so.  Just  as  individuals  can  engage  in  successful  moral  persuasion, 
government officials can be held accountable to their people through politi-
cal, rather than judicial, forms of accountability. We are familiar with this 
debate  through  recurrent  wrestling  with  the  problem  of judicial  review. 
Should judges defer to acts of  Congress, such as the recent health care legis-
lation enacted by Congress under the Obama Administration,30 or should the 
Supreme Court strike down some aspect of the  Jaw  as  an  infringement on 
individual liberty? It is  clear that a decision by the courts to  defer to Con-
gress does not remove  all  accountability from either the politicians or the 
United States itself. As  a democracy, the people are free to vote for a new 
Congress and President that will repeal old laws. The government remains 
politically accountable, both to its citizens and the international community, 
even if  no judicial or legal mechanisms exist to enforce that accountability. 
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Political accountability has the virtue of resting power on democratic 
norms of self-governance and equal voting rights for each citizen. The pro-
cesses by which democratic political systems work allow for national dia-
logue, lobbying, persuasion, party formation, politicking, and voting. Laws 
adopted through these procedures have some assurance of support by large 
numbers of people and thus may be more likely to be accepted than those 
imposed on people by unelected judges or elected judges who are nonethe-
less insulated from political accountability in various ways.
31 
Conversely,  political accountability has well-known deficits, not the 
least of which is the possibility that majorities may oppress minorities. The 
major argument for accountability by an independent judiciary is that some 
decisions are better made by individuals who are partly or totally insulated 
from the day-to-day pressures of politics. Judges are empowered to interpret 
and to enforce our most basic values. They may resist pressures to find a 
defendant guilty when the evidence is scant, no matter that many people are 
clamoring for his head. They may stop legislative majorities from limiting 
free speech rather than reacting to short run political pressures to curtail the 
speech of unpopular groups or individuals. Judicial accountability may al-
low us to enact our deepest, long-term values rather than responding willy-
nilly to the short term desires of  the majority that are insufficiently attentive 
to the need to preserve space for unpopular individuals or causes. 
As with internal and external accountability, there are virtues and vic-
es in both political and judicial forms of accountability. Political accounta-
bility is often swift and amenable  to  the  strong views of the  majority and 
freed from being undemocratically limited by unelected and unaccountable 
judges. But political accountability (and deference to the legislative branch-
es of government) also leaves the minority at the whim of the majority and 
may violate democratic norms by failing to enact our deepest values through 
protecting human rights.  One need only remember the Korematsu case to 
understand what is at stake here. 
32 
Conversely, judicial accountability has the advantage of allowing con-
sidered, slow reflection  by  individuals who are  not subject to  immediate 
removal or sanction because they act according to their-or the nation's-
conscience. The processes that judges use promote careful thought and rea-
soning; briefs are written, oral arguments are heard, and opinions are written 
to justify how rules are interpreted and applied. Cases present detailed facts 
and stories that teach us moral lessons we may not have learned when we 
31.  Although unelected federal judges are, to a large extent, beyond the control of 
Congress, the  impeachment power does render them subject to  political accountability of a 
kind. 
32.  Korematsu v.  United States, 323 U.S. 214,223-24 (1944) (holding an executive 
order that  required Japanese  Americans  to live  in  internment camps during World War II 
constitutional). Tribal Sovereignty and Human Rights  321 
were  acting  in  a  legislative  mode  to  enact  general  rules.  Cases  teach  us 
about unanticipated consequences of rules and enable us to limit their scope 
to appropriate situations. 
At  the  same time,  the  comparative  isolation of judges from  politics 
may protect them from  the  need  to  answer to  constituents,  and thus  free 
them  too  much  from  the  need to be  accountable themselves  to  the  broad 
public. We attempt to thread the needle by asking our judges to write opin-
ions  to  explain  their actions  while  reserving the  ultimate  sanction of im-
peachment, as  well  as the possibility of constitutional amendment. In  addi-
tion, we hope norms of professionalism will induce judges not to  overturn 
acts of Congress, state legislatures, or tribal  councils unless they are very 
confident that those acts violate fundamental norms and are oppressive. Yet 
we remain troubled by the role of  judges in reviewing the constitutionality 
of legislative acts,  and  it  is  evident that neither form  of accountability is 
perfect. For that reason, one alternative form of  judicial accountability is the 
declaratory judgment where  courts  eschew  a coercive  order and exercise 
their moral authority to  proclaim what the standards of  justice and fairness 
require, relying on the  moral authority of the court and respect for the rule 
of  law as the way to shape behavior and attitudes. 
C. Bilateral Versus Multilateral External Accountability 
Finally, it is evident that we are sometimes accountable to other indi-
viduals and sometimes to entities that represent collective groups who claim 
a right to regulate our conduct. For individuals, we  experience the need to 
explain ourselves to those we come into contact with-our family members, 
our friends,  our co-workers.  But we  also  must  appear before  employers, 
tribunals, committees, church councils, town governments, and representa-
tives of political bodies such as the police. So too with nations. Foreign af-
fairs involve both bilateral relations between pairs of  countries and multilat-
eral relations in entities such as the Organization of  American States and the 
United Nations. For Indian nations, this includes bilateral relations among 
those nations or between those nations and the United States, and multilat-
eral  relations among Indian nations through entities  such as  the  National 
Congress of  American Indians. 
Bilateral  relations  have  the  advantages  of specificity.  The  United 
States can tailor its relations with Canada and Mexico differently. Just as the 
institution of contract  allows  an  individual  to  shape  contractual  relations 
with each individual,  so  too do bilateral relations  allow specific tailoring. 
Bilateral relations  have  the  cost of eschewing any  common  standards  for 
fair treatment of other nations.  Multilateral relations sacrifice precision in 
order to  achieve a common standpoint from which to judge the conduct of 
nations.  They may  require  greater acts of compromise among conflicting 
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advantage of demonstrating to a rogue nation that many nations have come 
to a consensus that its actions cannot be justified. The process of multilat-
eral agreement is  akin to the process of constitution drafting and adoption. 
Conversation among the many may even improve  the  moral  status of the 
legal standard by engaging multiple perspectives. Of course the opposite is 
also true. Just as the majority may oppress the minority within a nation, the 
many may  gang up  on  the  one nation forcing it to  violate its  own under-
standing of  what is right for itself and its people. 
III. AN INTERTRIBAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL 
Our review of  the various institutional forms that accountability might 
take  lets  us  see  that Professor Singel's signal contribution is  to  suggest a 
new form of accountability for Indian nations that is at the same time exter-
nal, judicial, and multilateral.  She proposes that Indian nations accept the 
benefits of external accountability. Being forced to explain oneself to  oth-
ers, she argues, is not an oppressive deprivation of sovereignty but one of 
the  ways  one acts  responsibly  as  a sovereign.  Being held accountable to 
judicial, rather than merely political, accountability forces  a nation to  ex-
plain why  its short-run policies accord with its long-term and deepest val-
ues, while insulating decision making from political pressures of  majorities. 
Being held accountable by a multilateral group of Indian nations rather than 
only being held accountable in bilateral relations with other Indian nations 
or the United States may generate the benefits of common experience while 
avoiding the problem of colonial imposition by the United States. In  other 
words, Professor Singel has constructed a plausible institutional framework 
that attempts to  harness the  virtues of the various forms  of accountability 
while minimizing their vices. 
Of course, as we have seen, each of these forms of accountability has 
defects as well as benefits. External actors may unjustly impose their ethno-
centric views on less powerful neighbors. Judges may similarly impose their 
personal  views  on  the  majority  who has  reached  a  considered judgment 
about the  matter in question through democratic political procedures. And 
multilateral  regulation  may  subject a less  powerful  nation  to  an  external 
consensus in a way that deprives it of the right to be different and to chart 
its own path. 
As  is,  Indian  nations  face  both internal  and  external  accountability. 
They are subject to the dissent of  their own people and to criticism and reac-
tion by both other Indian nations and the United States.  Indian nations all 
enact a combination of judicial and political accountability internally and 
face  a combination of external judicial and political accountability  in  the 
forms  of Congressional  action  and federal  court  review.  They  face  both 
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tribal sovereignty, multilateral Indian nation organizations, and international 
human rights processes. 
What is missing from the current forms of accountability is  external, 
multilateral, and judicial accountability by Indian nations. That is precisely 
what Professor Singe! suggests to add to the mix. Her hope is that incorpo-
rating such accountability will allow Indian nations to justify themselves to 
others who are likely to understand where they are coming from and what 
their world  view is. 
33  That will lower the possibility of colonial oppression 
while  generating the  benefits  of forcing  Indian  nations  to  articulate their 
reasons to outsiders capable of understanding them. Judicial accountability 
provides the benefits of  reason-giving that characterize legal processes; such 
accountability tests whether political majorities can justify their desires in 
ways that can be characterized as fair to all affected by those policies. And 
the multilateral nature of the tribunal Professor Singe! proposes may gener-
ate greater confidence that its rulings are not ethnocentric but result from a 
consensus of similarly situated nations on the limits of sovereignty needed 
to reconcile power with justice. Indian nations would establish such a tribu-
nal through  negotiation and would determine  its jurisdiction, procedures, 
and powers. It might, for example, be given the power to make declaratory 
judgments rather than  the  power to  enact sanctions, or  it might  limit the 
sanctions permissible in different classes of cases. Such a tribunal also has 
the virtue of protecting Indian nations from the prospect of more intrusive 
and less sensitive impositions on tribal sovereignty by Congress or the Su-
preme  Court,  while  potentially  instilling  confidence  in  both  Indians  and 
non-Indians in sovereign nations. 
If such a tribunal were to address the question of the Cherokee Freed-
men, it might help to answer the question of whether there is--or is not-a 
legitimate defense to the charge that the Cherokee Nation has engaged in an 
unjust action by expelling the descendants of its former slaves from citizen-
ship.  Such a tribunal would engage representatives of other Indian nations 
that face  similar problems in defining citizenship and that share many as-
pects of  a common worldview. Conversation with and among judges chosen 
from  multiple tribes empowered to  attempt to  reconcile majority rule and 
individual rights  may  help  engage  the  various  forms  of moral  reasoning 
needed to come to  a resolution of this question.  The conversation such a 
tribunal  would  generate  might have  significant benefits  in  itself.  Such  a 
tribunal might generate an outcome that would be easier for the majority of 
citizens in the Cherokee Nation to accept than a political one generated by 
Congress  or the  Secretary of the Interior,  or a judicial one  imposed by a 
federal court. It might also give the Cherokee Freedmen a tribunal that is 
33.  Tsosie, supra note 7,  at 529-32 (explaining that most tribes have a shared con-
ception of individuals as linked to others in their community and thus conceptualize individ-
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legitimately empowered to protect their rights because it is a tribunal creat-
ed by Indian nations whose rulings could be understood as  an exercise of 
tribal sovereignty rather than a limitation of  it.  Such a tribunal would avoid 
the problems of  colonialism that ensue when the United States and its courts 
tell Indian nations what to do. All this means that a decision of  a multilateral 
intertribal human rights tribunal might constitute an exercise of negotiated 
self-government that would be more democratically legitimate than unilat-
eral actions by the United States government imposed on the Cherokee Na-
tion by fiat. 
It is not clear how such an intertribal human rights tribunal would ana-
lyze the case of the Cherokee Freedmen. No political or judicial solution to 
this issue will satisfy everyone even if all agree that sovereigns should not 
abuse human rights. Both philosophers and human history teach us that sov-
ereigns have the potential to  promote freedom and justice, but they also, 
from time to time, oppress their own people as well as others. If might does 
not make right, then we cannot avoid the human task of  figuring out what is 
right.  And if human rights  are  to be respected,  then legal rights  must be 
matched with remedies likely to affect behavior of  oppressors. 
Professor Singel has charted a new path in the woods. Two heads, she 
counsels, are sometimes better than one.  And multilateral institutions pro-
vide the benefits of  democratic dialogue and mutual persuasion. The obliga-
tion to explain oneself to others whom one trusts can be a powerful deter-
rent  to  wrongdoing.  And a  commitment  to  comply  with  the  considered 
judgments of a multilateral judicial tribunal can be seen, not as a surrender 
of  sovereignty, but a confident assertion of  it. 
34 
34.  See id.  at 524  ("To the  extent that  the tribe remains a viable political entity, 
tribal members are able to preserve their cultural integrity, and ultimately, they can enforce 
their rights within the tribal context."). 